Regulation of Foreign Investment in Historical Perspective

Ha-Joon Chang

December 2003
REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Ha-Joon Chang
Faculty of Economics and Politics
University of Cambridge

Abstract

Based on a historical survey of the experiences of the USA, the EU member states and the East Asian economies, the paper argues that during their early stages of development, now-developed countries systematically discriminated between domestic and foreign investors in their industrial policy. They have used a range of instruments to build up national industry. They included: limits on ownership; performance requirements on exports, technology transfer or local procurement; insistence on joint ventures with local firms; and barriers to ‘brownfield investments’ through mergers and acquisitions. On the basis of this, the paper argues that a multilateral investment agreement (MIA) at the WTO, founded on principle of national treatment, is likely to harm the developing countries’ prospects for development. Our historical survey shows that, only when domestic industry has reached a certain level of sophistication, complexity, and competitiveness do the benefits of non-discrimination and liberalisation appear to outweigh the costs. As a result, countries generally move towards a greater degree of non-discrimination and liberalisation as they develop. In that sense, contrary to the claims of the demandeurs of the MIA non-discrimination is better seen as an outcome of development, not a cause.

UNU/INTECH Discussion Papers
ISSN 1564-8370

Copyright © 2002 The United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies, UNU/INTECH

UNU/INTECH discussion papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of the research carried out at the institute to attract comments

1 The paper draws on a joint research project with Duncan Green of CAFOD (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development), whose results were published as a paper titled, “The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment: Do as we Say, Not as we Did” by the South Centre, Geneva, and CAFOD, London, in June 2003. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop on “Understanding FDI-Assisted Economic Development” at the TIK Centre, University of Oslo, 22-25 May, 2003. While the material in the present paper is based on my contribution to the joint project, my intellectual interaction with Duncan Green during our joint work makes it difficult to separate my contribution neatly from his. I thank him very much for his partnership, intellectual and political. I also thank the South Centre and the Rockefeller Foundation for their support for the project. I also thank the research support from the Korea Research Foundation through its BK21 programme at the Department of Economics, Korea University, where I was a visiting research professor when the first draft was written. I benefited greatly from comments by Lynn Mytelka, Rajah Rasiah, and an anonymous referee in producing the final version of the paper.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION 7

2. FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9

2.1. THE USA 9
   Overview 9
   Federal Legislation 11
   State Legislation 13
   Lessons from the US Experience 14

2.2. THE MORE ADVANCED EUROPEAN ECONOMIES – THE UK, FRANCE, AND GERMANY 15
   Overview 15
   Lessons from the Experiences of the UK, France, and Germany 17

2.3. THE LESS ADVANCED EUROPEAN ECONOMIES: FINLAND AND IRELAND 17
   Finland 18
   Ireland 19
   Lessons from the Experiences of Finland and Ireland 21

2.4. THE EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 22
   Japan 22
   Korea 24
   Taiwan 26
   Lessons from the East Asian Experience 27

3. IMPLICATIONS: LESSONS OF HISTORY 29

4. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 33

4.1. “TIMES HAVE CHANGED” – THE IRRELEVANCE OF HISTORY? 33

4.2. “WE WANT TO PROTECT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM HARMING THEMSELVES” 34

4.3. “THE AGREEMENT CAN BE MADE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH – WE SIMPLY WANT CERTAINTY” 34

4.4. “AN MIA IN THE WTO IS THE LESSER OF THE TWO EVILS” – THE FEARS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITs) AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (RTAs) 35

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 37

REFERENCES 39

THE UNU/INTECH DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 41
1.0. INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, the developed countries have stepped up their efforts to install a multilateral investment agreement (MIA) that prevents countries from controlling FDI, and possibly portfolio investments.

Initially, this was pursued mainly through the OECD, where it was proposed that developed countries should adopt an MIA to which willing developing countries would also be allowed to sign up. When this move was thwarted in 1998, the main battleground on this issue was moved to the WTO, where the possibility of an MIA comprising all member countries is seriously being discussed.

There are a number of reasons why many developing countries opposed a decision to begin negotiations on MIA during the last WTO negotiations in Cancun. First, contrary to what its proponents often argue, an MIA is unlikely to lead to increased flows of foreign investment. Second, it will merely add to, rather than replace, the patchwork quilt of over 2000 bilateral investment treaties. Third, the Doha agenda is already overloaded, to the detriment of developing country participation. Fourth, the promises of flexibility for developing countries will be undermined by the realities of negotiations in this and subsequent rounds. And, last but not least, there is a lack of balancing obligations on home countries and investors.

This paper adds one more, rather compelling reason, in our view, to this already-long list. Based on a historical survey of the experiences of the USA, the EU member states and the East Asian economies, it argues that during their early stages of development, now-developed countries systematically discriminated between domestic and foreign investors in their industrial policy. These countries used a range of instruments to build up national industry, including: limits on ownership; performance requirements on exports, technology transfer or local procurement; insistence on joint ventures with local firms; and barriers to ‘brownfield investments’ through mergers and acquisitions.

These findings are particularly important because the main ‘demandeurs’ of investment negotiations, the EU and Japan, insist that non-discrimination, and in particular national treatment (there are fewer problems with most favoured nation treatment), should be a central aspect of any MIA. However, our historical survey shows that, only when domestic industry has reached a certain level of sophistication, complexity, and competitiveness do the benefits of non-discrimination and liberalisation appear to outweigh the costs. As a result, countries generally move towards a greater degree of non-discrimination and liberalisation as they
develop. In that sense, non-discrimination is better seen as an *outcome* of development, not a cause, and therefore an MIA founded on this principle is likely to harm the developing countries’ prospects for development.
2. FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1. The USA

Overview
From its early days of economic development to the First World War, the USA was the world’s largest importer of foreign capital. The eminent business historian Mira Wilkins states that during the 1875-1914 period, the USA was “the greatest debtor nation in history” despite its rise as one of the major lender countries in the international capital market at the end of this period (Wilkins, 1989, p. 144).

Given the country’s position as a net importer of capital, there was naturally a lot of concern about foreign investment. While many Americans accepted the necessity of foreign investment and some sought it enthusiastically, there was also a widespread concern about “absentee management” (Wilkins, 1989, p. 563), and, further, foreign domination of the American economy.

The fear of foreign investment was not confined to the “radicals”. For example, the Bankers’ Magazine of New York remarked in 1884: “It will be a happy day for us when not a single good American security is owned abroad and when the United States shall cease to be an exploiting ground for European bankers and money lenders. The tribute paid to foreigners is … odious … We have outgrown the necessity of submitting to the humiliation of going to London, Paris or Frankfort [sic] for capital has become amply abundant for all home demands” (Bankers’ Magazine, no. 38, January, 1884, cited in Wilkins, 1989, p. 565). According to the same magazine, the great majority of Americans believed it was “a misfortune to have its [the country’s] public, corporate, and private securities abroad” (no. 33, April, 1879, cited in Wilkins, p. 915, note 67).

---

2 Even until as late as 1914, when it had caught up with the UK and other leading nations of Europe, the USA was one of the largest net borrowers in the international capital market. The authoritative estimate by Wilkins (1989) puts the level of US foreign debt at $7.1 billion, with Russia ($3.8 billion) and Canada ($3.7 billion) trailing in distance (p. 145, table, 5.3). Of course, at that point, the USA, with its estimated lending at $3.5 billion, was also the 4th largest lending country, after the UK ($18 billion), France ($9 billion), and Germany ($7.3 billion). However, even after subtracting its lending, the US still has a net borrowing position of $3.6 billion, which is basically the same as the Russian and the Canadian one.
Even Andrew Jackson (the seventh President of the USA, 1829-37), a well-known advocate of small government and therefore something of a hero among American free-marketeers today, amply displayed anti-foreign feelings. He famously vetoed the renewal of the federal government charter for the country’s second quasi-central bank, the (second) Bank of the USA, largely on the ground that “many of its stockholders were foreigners” (Wilkins, pp. 61-2, p. 84; Garraty & Carnes, 2000, pp. 255-8). When he exercised his veto in 1832, he said: “should the stock of the bank principally pass into the hands of the subjects of a foreign country, and we should unfortunately become involved in a war with that country, what would be our condition? …. Controlling our currency, receiving our public moneys, and holding thousands of our citizens in dependence, it would be far more formidable and dangerous than the naval and military power of the enemy. If we must have a bank … it should be purely American.” (as cited in Wilkins, 1989, p. 84).

Others would go even further. On the eve of the de-chartering of the Second Bank of the USA (henceforth SBUSA), the Jackson government moved federal government deposits to other banks. One of these banks, the Manhattan Bank, was foreign-owned but, not being a federally-chartered bank like the SBUSA, it did not ban foreign shareholders from voting (which was the case with federally-chartered banks – see below). Therefore, Niles’ Weekly Register, one of the leading magazines of the time, found it scandalous that “IN THIS BANK THE FOREIGN STOCKHOLDERS VOTE [capitals original]!” (no. 45, 16 Nov, 1833, cited in Wilkins, 1989, p. 84). Another article that appeared two years later in this magazine (no. 48., 2 May, 1835) neatly sums up the dominant American feeling at the time – “We have no horror of FOREIGN CAPITAL— if subjected to American management.” (cited in Wilkins, 1989, p. 85, italics and capitals original).

One important point to note is that all these concerns about foreign investment were expressed despite the fact that the importance of foreign investment in the USA at the time was far less important when compared to that in today’s developing countries. For example, inward FDI stock of the USA in 1914 was 3.7% of GDP (Held et al., 1999, p. 275, table 5.13). In contrast, the same figure for developing countries was 4.8% in 1980, 10.5% in 1990 and 19.9% in 1995 (Crotty et al., 1998, table 3). In other words, if many people in the US in the 19th and the early-20th century were concerned with the impacts of foreign investment, then their counterparts in developing countries today have even more reason for concern.

\[\text{3 However, the Second Bank of the USA was only 30\% owned by foreigners, as opposed to 70\% in the case of the First Bank of the USA, its predecessor (1789-1811) (Wilkins, 1989, p. 61).}\]

\[\text{4 Wilkins says (1989, p. 84, n. 264) that similar remarks were made by politicians in the debate surrounding the renewal of the charter of the first Bank of the USA.}\]
In order to ensure that foreign investment would not lead to the loss of national control in key sectors of the economy, a large number of federal and state legislation were enacted in the USA since its Independence until the mid-20th century, when it became the world’s leading economy. The legislation particularly targeted the finance, shipping and natural resource extraction (agriculture, mining, logging) sectors, which were the main recipients of foreign investments during this period.

**Federal Legislation**

(a) Navigation

One of the first acts of the new Congress upon Independence as an imposition in 1791 of differential tonnage duties between national and foreign ships (Wilkins, 1989, p. 44). Similarly, a navigation monopoly for US ships for coastwise trade imposed in 1817 by the Congress (Wilkins, 1989, p. 83). This continued until WWI (Wilkins, 1989, p. 583).

(b) Finance

In the financial sector, legislative provisions were made in the charter for the country’s first quasi-central bank, the first Bank of the USA (henceforth FBUSA) in 1791 to avoid foreign domination. Only resident shareholders could vote and only American citizens could become a director. Thanks to these provisions the Bank could not be controlled by foreigners, who owned 62% of the shares by 1803 and 70% by 1811. In spite of these measures the Congress did not re-charter the Bank when its charter was up for renewal in 1811, “in large part owing to fears of foreign influence” (Wilkins, 1989, pp. 38-9/61; the quote is from p. 61). A similar provision against voting by foreign shareholders was made for the SBUSA, when it was given the federal charter in 1816 (Wilkins, 1989, p. 61).

In addition, the 1864 National Bank Act also required that the directors of national (as opposed to state) banks had to be Americans (Wilkins, 1989, p. 455) – this lasted even after the introduction of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 (Wilkins, 1989, p. 583). This meant that “foreign individuals and foreign financial institutions could buy shares in U.S. national banks if they were prepared to have American citizens as their representatives on the board of directors” And therefore “[t]hat they could not directly control the banks served as a deterrent to investment” (Wilkins, 1989, p. 583).

(c) Land

From the early days of independence, many state governments barred or restricted non-resident foreign investment in land (Wilkins, 1989, p. 45). However, particularly strong feelings against foreign land ownership developed, following the frenzy of land speculation by foreigners in the
frontier areas in the 1880s. In 1885, the *New York Times* editorialised against “an evil of considerable magnitude—the acquisition of vast tracts of land in the Territories by English noblemen” (NYT, 24, Jan., 1885, as cited in Wilkins, 1989, p. 569).

Reflecting such feelings, the federal Alien Property Act (1887) and 12 state laws were enacted during 1885-95 with a view to control, or sometime even altogether ban, foreign investment in land (Wilkins, 1989, p. 235). An 1885 resolution passed by the New Hampshire legislature read: “American soil is for Americans, and should be exclusively owned and controlled by American citizens” (Wilkins, 1989, p. 569). The 1887 federal Alien Property Act prohibited the ownership of land by aliens or by companies more than 20% owned by aliens in the territories (as opposed to the states), where land speculation was particularly rampant (Wilkins, 1989, p. 241). However, it must be noted that due to the lack of disclosure rule on ownership, it was practically not possible to check upon the identities of all the corporate owners and therefore the law was not totally effective (Wilkins, 1989, p. 582).

(d) Natural Resources

There was less hostility towards foreign investment in mining than towards that in land, but still considerable ill-feelings existed (Wilkins, 1989, pp. 572-3). Federal mining laws in 1866, 1870, and 1872 restricted mining rights to US citizens and companies incorporated in the USA. In 1878, a timber law was enacted, permitting only US residents to log on public land (Wilkins, 1989, p. 581). As was the case with the Alien Property Act, these laws were not totally effectual against foreign corporate investment, due to the difficulty of checking company ownership (p. 129). In 1897, the Alien Property Act was revised to exempt mining lands.

(e) Manufacturing

Restrictions on foreign investment in manufacturing were relatively rare, as such investment was not very important until the late 19th century, by which time the USA had managed to build up a robust position in many sectors of manufacturing behind the world’s highest tariff barrier.

However, there were still concerns about the behaviour of TNCs in manufacturing, especially transfer pricing. For example, a US government investigation in the wake of the First World War expressed grave concerns that the German TNCs were avoiding income tax payment by

---

5 At the time the territories were North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Oklahoma, and Alaska. The Dakotas, Montana, and Washington in 1889 and Idaho and Wyoming in 1890 and Utah became sates in 1896, thus stop being subject to this Act.

6 The 1866 law said that “[t]he mineral lands of the public domain … are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration by all citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become citizens, subject to such regulations s may be prescribed by law, and subject also to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts” (Wilkins, 1989, p. 128).
understating their net earnings through excessive charging for technology licenses granted to their American subsidiaries (Wilkins, 1989, p. 171).

An interesting development in relation to FDI in manufacturing was the 1885 contract labour law, which prohibited the import of foreign workers. This applied also to national companies, but it obviously affected foreign firms more, especially in relation to the import of skilled workers (Wilkins, 1989, pp. 582-3). Many TNCs did not like the law because it restricted their ability to bring in skilled workers from their headquarters.

State Legislation

Some of the state laws were even more hostile to foreign investment than the federal laws (Wilkins, 1989, p. 579).

In addition to state laws banning or restricting non-resident foreigners’ investment in land that had existed from the early days of independence, 12 state laws were enacted during 1885-95 with a view to control and in some cases to ban altogether, foreign investment in land (Wilkins, 1989, p. 235). In addition, there were number of state laws that taxed foreign companies more heavily than the American ones. A notorious Indiana law in 1887 went as far as withdrawing court protection from foreign firms (p. 579).

The New York state government took a particularly hostile attitude towards foreign investment in finance, an area where it was rapidly developing a world-class position (a case of infant industry protection, one may say). A New York law in 1886 required foreign insurance companies to have 2.5-times the minimum paid-up capital of American companies (p. 580), while another law required that all certified public accountants (CPAs) should be American nationals (p. 580). The New York state also instituted a law in the 1880s that banned foreign banks from engaging in “banking business” (such as taking deposits and discounting notes or Bills). The 1914 banking law banned the establishment of foreign bank branches (Wilkins, 1989, p. 456). These laws proved very burdensome on foreign banks. For example, the London City and Midland Bank (the then world’s third largest bank, measured by deposits) could not open a New York branch, when it had 867 branches worldwide and 45 correspondent banks in the USA alone (Wilkins, 1989, p. 456).

On the whole the federal government condoned anti-foreign state laws. Wilkins (1989) writes: “The State Department and Congress did give an implicit green light to anti-foreign state government laws. Neither was responsive to intermittent diplomatic inquiries from London, requesting the federal government to muzzle state legislators. The Secretary of State John Hay replied (in 1899) in a very standard manner to one such request that was related to
Lessons from the US Experience

To sum up, in contrast to its strong support for foreign investment liberalisation today the USA, as a capital-importing country, had utilised all kinds of provisions to ensure that foreigners invested in the country but did not control its economy.

For example, the US federal government had restrictions on foreigners’ ownership in agricultural land, mining, and logging. It discriminated against foreign firms in banking and insurance, while prohibiting foreign investment in coastal shipping. It demanded that all directors of national banks be American citizens, while depriving foreign shareholders of voting rights in the case of federally-chartered banks. It also prohibited the employment of foreign workers, thus implicitly disadvantaging foreign investors that wanted to import skilled labour from their home countries.

Even more restrictions were applied at the state level. In addition to restrictions on land ownership, many states taxed foreign companies more heavily and some even refused to grant them legal protection. State legislation in the financial sector was even more discriminatory. Some states imposed stricter capital base requirements on foreign financial institutions, and some even totally banned entry into certain financial industries (New York state laws banning foreign bank entry are a case in point). The federal government condoned such laws and refused to take action against state governments even in the face of pressure from foreign investors and governments to do so.

What are the lessons that we can derive from the historical experience of the USA in relation to foreign investment policy?

The first important point to note is that, despite its often-draconian regulations on foreign investment, the USA was the largest recipient of foreign investment. This puts to question the common contention that foreign investment regulation is bound to reduce investment flows. It should be mentioned that contemporary empirical evidence also shows foreign investment regulations to have only a marginal, if any, influence on the determination of foreign investment decisions (see the review in Kumar, 2001, p. 3156). In particular, the large foreign investment inflow into China, with its numerous regulations on foreign investment, shows that regulations are not a major determinant of foreign investment. Therefore, it is simply erroneous to believe that an MIA will increase foreign investment.
The second, and more important, point is that, despite its strict regulations on foreign investment (as well as manufacturing tariffs that were the highest in the world), the USA was the fastest-growing economy in the world throughout the 19th century up until the 1920s. This questions another common contention that foreign investment regulation will harm the growth prospects of an economy. When combined with the fact that many other developed countries that we shall review below also performed well despite having in place strict regulations on foreign investment, it seems more reasonable to conclude that a well-crafted regime of foreign investment regulation can help, rather than hinder, economic development.

2.2. The More Advanced European Economies – The UK, France, and Germany

Overview

Until the early 20th century, the UK, France, Germany (together with the Netherlands and Switzerland) were mostly suppliers of capital to the less developed countries, including the USA, Canada, and Russia. Their main concern during this period, therefore - especially for the UK from the late 19th century, when it was rapidly losing its industrial supremacy - was how to control “excessive” outward foreign investment rather than how to control inward foreign investment.

In the decades following the end of the Second World War, however, controlling inward foreign investment became a major new challenge for these countries. If they were to close the newly-emergent technological gap with the USA, they had to accept American investment, especially FDI (Servan-Schreiber, 1967, is the most prominent work of the time on this issue).

Given that these countries did not adopt laws explicitly discriminating against foreign investors until the 1980s - except in sensitive areas (e.g., defence, cultural industries) - the most important element in their control of foreign investment was the use of foreign exchange controls, which gave these governments the ultimate say in foreign investment. This does not necessarily mean that all governments used the control to the same effect. Between 1947 and 1979, even before the adoption of its pro-FDI policy under Mrs. Thatcher, the UK had taken a more permissive attitude towards FDI and rarely used its foreign exchange control law (1947-79) to influence FDI (Young et al., 1988), whereas France exercised more direct management of its FDI flows.

Several additional control mechanisms were employed by countries during this period. First, in all of these countries (except the UK after the 1980s), the significant presence of State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) in key sectors in the economy has acted as an important barrier to FDI. A variety of other key enterprises, although technically not SOEs, have had significant government ownership—the state government of Lower Saxony is the biggest shareholder of Volkswagen, for instance, with a 20% share ownership. Moreover, even when privatising some of the SOEs in the 1980s, the French government was careful to ensure that control of these enterprises remain French by reserving a significant proportion of shares for “hard core” (noyau dûr) institutional investors close to the government (Dormois, 1999, p. 79).

Second, in the case of Germany, the barriers to hostile take-overs, due to the presence of close industry-bank relationships as well as to the power of labour exercised through the supervisory board, has acted as a significant barrier to FDI. Given that in the UK, where hostile take-over is easy, the bulk of FDI has consisted of “brownfield” investment based on take-overs rather than “greenfield” investment, FDI in Germany could have been considerably higher without these defence mechanisms.

Third, all these countries, including the ostensibly FDI-friendly UK, have used informal performance requirements for key FDI projects. In the UK a variety of informal “undertakings” and “voluntary restrictions” have been used to regulate foreign investment in certain industries from the 1970s (Young et al., 1988). These controls have mostly, although not exclusively, targeted at Japanese companies, especially in automobile and electronics. According to Young et al. (1988), “[i]t is widely believed that [all investments by Japanese electronics giants in the 1970s and the early 1980s – Sony in 1974, Matsushita in 1976, Hitachi and Mitsubishi in 1979, Sanyo and Toshiba in 1981] were subject to some form of voluntary restraint agreement with the Department of Industry on local sourcing of components, production volumes and exporting, but details are not publicly available. Several of the companies reported particular difficulties in implementing local procurement policies and in the slow build up of production which they were allowed” (p. 224). This prompted one observer to remark in 1977 that “every Japanese company which has so far invested in Britain had been required to make confidential assurances, mainly about export ratios and local purchasing” (Financial Times, 6 December, 1984).

According to the authoritative study by the IMF published in 1984, the average share of SOE sector in GDP among the industrialised countries as of mid-1970s was 9.4%. The share was 10.3% for West Germany (1976-7), 11.3% for the UK (1974-7), and 11.9% for France (1974) – all above this average.

In Germany, corporations are governed not simply by the Board of Directors, but also by the supervisory board, which contains equal number of representatives from the workers and from the management (with the casting vote on the management side). This is called the co-determination system and has been a foundational stone of Germany’s “social market economy” after the Second World War.

During the 1970s and the 1980s, Germany’s FDI as a share of Gross Domestic Capital Formation (of course, the two numbers are not strictly comparable) just 1-2%, whereas the
1977, as reported in Young et al., 1988, p. 223). When Nissan established a UK plant in 1981, it was forced to procure 60% of value added locally, with a time scale over which this would rise to 80 per cent (Young et al., 1988, p. 225). Also “[t]here is much evidence that successive ministers in the Department of Trade and Industry have put pressure on [Ford and GM] to achieve a better balance of trade, although details in timing and targets are not available” (p. 225). Young et al. observed in 1988 that “limited use of performance guidelines (if not explicit requirements) are effectively now regarded as part of the UK portfolio” (p. 225).

Lessons from the Experiences of the UK, France, and Germany
To sum up, the UK, France, and Germany did not have to control foreign investment before the mid-20th Century, as they were capital-exporting countries during this time. However, when faced with the challenge of an upsurge in American investment after the Second World War, they used a number of formal and informal mechanisms to ensure the continued protection of their national interests. Formal mechanisms included foreign exchange control and regulations against foreign investment in sensitive sectors like defence or cultural industries. At the informal level, they used mechanisms like the SOEs, restrictions on take-over, and “undertakings” and “voluntary restrictions” by TNCs in order to restrict foreign investment and impose performance requirements.

The tightening of foreign investment regulation after the Second World War by these three countries reflected the changes in their status in the international investment game. As they switched their positions as net foreign investors with the USA, they adopted the very restrictions on foreign investment that they had criticised when these had been used by the USA.

These examples suggest that countries should use, and indeed have used, different policies towards foreign investment according to their status in the international investment flows. Given that developing countries are almost always at the receiving end of these flows, they need, and should be allowed to have, significantly more restrictive approaches towards foreign investment than do the developed countries.

2.3. The Less Advanced European Economies: Finland and Ireland

In this section, we examine Finland and Ireland – two countries that were among the poorest in Europe until a generation ago but which have become star performers by adopting very
different policies towards foreign investment - the former highly restrictive and the latter highly permissive (although not as hands-off as many people believe).

**Finland**

Finland is often overlooked as one of the economic miracles of the 20th century. Until the late 19th century, Finland was one of the poorest economies in the Europe. Today it is one of the richest. According to the authoritative statistical work by Maddison (1989), among the 16 largest rich countries of today, only Japan (3.1%) achieved a higher rate of annual per capita income growth than that of Finland (2.6%) during the 1900-87 period (p. 15, table 1.2).\(^{10}\) Norway tied with Finland in the second place, and the average for all 16 countries was 2.1%.\(^ {11}\)

Even less well known is the fact that Finland’s impressive growth performance was built on the basis of a regime of draconian restrictions on foreign investment – arguably the most restrictive in the developed world.

As a country that had been under foreign rule for centuries\(^ {12}\) and as one of the poorest economies in Europe, Finland was naturally extremely wary of foreign investment and duly implemented measures to restrict it (all information in the following paragraphs is drawn from Hjerpe & Ahvenainen, 1986, pp. 287-295, unless otherwise noted).

As early as 1851, Finland had established a law prescribing that any foreigner, Russian nobles excepted, had to obtain permission from the Tsar, then its ultimate ruler of the country, to own land. Added to this was the 1883 law that subjected mining by foreigners to license, the 1886 ban on banking business by foreigners, and the 1889 ban on building and operation of railways by foreigners. In 1895, it was stipulated that the majority of the members on the board of directors of limited liability companies had to be Finnish. All these laws remained valid until at least the mid-1980s.

After its independence from Russia Finland strengthened its restrictions on foreign investment. In 1919, it was stipulated that foreigners had to get special permission to establish a business.

---

\(^{10}\) The 16 countries are, in alphabetical order, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, the UK, and the USA.

\(^{11}\) Despite the massive external shock that it received following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which accounted for over one-third of its international trade, Finland ranked at a very respectable joint-5th among the 16 countries in terms of per capita income growth during the 1990s. According to the World Bank data, its annual per capita income growth rate during 1990-99 was 2.1% (same with that of the Netherlands), exceeded only by Norway (3.2%), Australia (2.6%), and Denmark and the USA (2.4%).

\(^{12}\) From the 12th century until 1809, it was part of Sweden, then it existed as an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian empire until 1917.
and guarantee in advance the payment of taxes and other charges due to the central and the local states. In the 1930s, a series of laws was passed to ensure that no foreigner could own land and mining rights. It was also legislated that a foreigner could not become a member of the board of directors, or the general manager of a firm. Companies with more than 20% foreign ownership were officially classified as “dangerous companies” and therefore foreign ownership of companies was restricted to 20%. As a result, while there was a considerable foreign borrowing, there was little FDI during this period, a pattern that persisted at least until the 1980s.

Some liberalisation of foreign investment occurred in the 1980s. In the early 1980s foreign banks were allowed for the first time to found branches in Finland. Foreign ownership ceiling of companies was raised to 40% in 1987, but this was subject to the consent by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Bellak & Luostarinen, 1994, p. 17). A general liberalisation of foreign investment was made only in 1993 in preparation for the country’s EU accession (www.investinfinland.fi/topical/leipa_survey01.htm, p. 1).

**Ireland**

Ireland is often touted as the exemplification of how a dynamic and prosperous economy can be built on the basis of a liberal FDI policy. Its impressive economic performance, especially during the recent period, earned it the titles of “Celtic Tiger” or “Emerald Tiger”, following the “miracle” economies of the “East Asian Tigers” (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong King).

After the exhaustion of early import substitution possibilities and the ensuing industrial stagnation in the 1950s, Ireland shifted its industrial policy radically from an inward-looking to an outward-looking strategy (for further historical backgrounds, see O’Malley, 1989). The new policy regime focused on encouraging investment, especially in export industries, through financial incentives. The main incentive schemes used were: (1) capital investment grant, which required the recipient firms to be internationally competitive; (2) exemption of tax for profits earned from export sales above the 1956 level (the law had no new recipients after 1981 and was abolished in 1991); and (3) accelerated depreciation (O’Malley, 1999, pp. 224-5). In addition to encouraging investment, these schemes were also intended to reduce regional disparity by offering higher grant rates for investment in less developed regions. Additionally, the government established industrial estates in poor regions at its own expense (O’Malley, 1999, p. 225).

---

13 Interestingly, the government investment-promotion agency, Invest in Finland, emphasises that ‘Finland does not ‘positively’ discriminate foreign-owned firms by giving them tax holidays or other subsidies not available to other firms in the economy’ (the same website, p. 2).
While this policy regime did not favour foreign enterprises \textit{per se}, it had a certain degree of bias for foreign enterprises, as they typically had a higher export orientation. The existence of this bias towards TNCs, however, should not be interpreted as the same as being tantamount to a totally \textit{laissez-faire} approach towards FDI. According to the 1981 US Department of Commerce survey, \textit{The Use of Investment Incentives and Performance Requirements by Foreign Governments}, 20\% of US TNC affiliates operating in Ireland reported the imposition of performance requirements, in contrast to the 2-7\% in other advanced countries – 8\% in Australia and Japan, 7\% in Belgium, Canada, France, and Switzerland, 6\% in Italy, 3\% in the UK, and 2\% in Germany and the Netherlands) (Young et al., 1988, pp. 199-200).\textsuperscript{14} However, it is true that the investment grants disbursed during this period were rather unfocused and therefore did not deliver the best value for money (O’Sullivan, 1995; O’Malley, 1999).

The post-1958 industrial policy had run out of steam by the late 1970s. FDI continued to be mostly in low-value-added sectors, while there was little success in creating linkages with indigenous firms. A sense of crisis had set in by the mid-1980s, when employment in indigenous firms, which had reached a peak in 1979, experienced a rather sharp decline (about 20\%) and employment in foreign firms more or less stagnated from the late 1970s (O’Sullivan, 1995; O’Malley, 1999; Barry et al., 1999).

As a result, there was another policy shift in the mid-1980s towards a more targeted approach, especially towards the development of indigenous firms. The new policy regime was set out most clearly in the 1984 \textit{White Paper on Industrial Policy} (O’Malley, 1999, p. 228). According to O’Malley (1999), the White Paper recognised that “there were limits to the benefits that could be expected from foreign investment and that the relatively poor long-term performance of indigenous industry called for a greater focus in addressing the problem. More specifically, policy statements since 1984 have referred to a need for policy towards indigenous industry to be more selective, aiming to develop larger and stronger firms with good prospects for sustained growth in international markets, rather than assisting a great many firms indiscriminately. Policy was intended to become more selective, too, in the sense of concentrating state support and incentives on correcting specific areas of disadvantage or weakness that were characteristic of indigenous, rather than foreign firms, such as technological capability, export marketing and

\textsuperscript{14} Interestingly, according to McCulloch & Owen (1983, pp. 342-3) the same survey reveals that over one-half of all foreign subsidiaries in Korea and Taiwan benefit from some form of investment incentive. This is high even by the standards of the developed countries, which were in the 9-37\% range reported in table 6.1 of Young et al. (1988, p. 200: Japan 9\%; Switzerland 12\%; Canada and France 18\%; Germany 20\%; Belgium, 26\%; Italy 29\%; UK 32\%; Australia 37\%). Given that Korea and Taiwan are countries that were also infamous for imposing tough performance requirements (see below), this piece of evidence, together with the Irish example, suggests that both carrots and sticks are needed for a successful management of FDI.
skills. The intention of such policy shifts was to move industrial policy away from supporting capital investment towards improving technology and export marketing” (p. 228; italics added).

As a result, after the mid-1980s, “the award of [capital investment] grants was increasingly dependent on firms having prepared overall company development plans. With a view to obtaining better value for state expenditure, the average rate of capital grants was reduced after 1986, performance-related targets were applied as conditions for payment of grants, and there was the beginning of a move towards repayable forms of financial support such as equity financing rather than capital grants.” (O’Malley, 1999, p. 229; italics added).\(^\text{15}\) An increasing share of government grants was directed to capability-upgrading activities (e.g., R&D, training, management development) rather than simple physical investment (Sweeney, 1998, p. 133). Moreover, the government started to explicitly target industries into which it want to attract FDI – the emphasis being given to industries like electronics, pharmaceutical, software, financial services, and teleservices (Sweeney, 1998, p. 128).

Following the re-direction of FDI policy, there was a rise in high-quality FDI, with stronger linkages to indigenous firms. Largely as a result of this, the economy started to boom again. Manufacturing employment, which fell by 20% during 1979-87, rose by 13% during 1988-96, in large part due to increase in FDI but also due to the improvement in the performance by indigenous firms (O’Malley, 1999, p. 230).

\textit{Lessons from the Experiences of Finland and Ireland}

Finland and Ireland are arguably among the most impressive cases of industrial transformation in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in Europe. However, their respective policies towards foreign investment could not have been more diametrically opposed - at least until Finland’s accession to the EU in 1993 – with Finland basically blocking any significant foreign investment, while Ireland aggressively sought it out.

\(^{15}\) In light of the fact that Ireland was already a country with high level of performance requirement for TNCs before these changes (see above), it seems reasonable to conclude that performance requirement for the recipients of state grants (domestic or foreign) must have become even greater.
The comparison of these two polar cases raises two important points. The first is that there can be no “one-size-fits-all” foreign investment policy. Finland built its economic miracle under arguably one of the world’s most restrictive policy regimes vis-à-vis foreign investors, while Ireland benefited from actively courting and working with TNCs.

The second point is that, however “liberal” a country may be towards foreign investment, a targeted and performance-oriented approach works better than the hands-off approach that is recommended by the developed countries today. Even in the case of Ireland, a combination carrot and stick approach has been used to regulate foreign investors since the early days. It was only when it got the balance between the two that the country started to truly benefit from FDI.

2.4. The East Asian Countries

Japan
Japan’s restrictive stance towards FDI is well known. From the Meiji period on, the country has tried its best to discourage FDI, preferring technology licensing whenever feasible. Even during the first half of the 20th century, when Japan temporarily took a more permissive stance towards FDI - the American TNCs dominated the automobile industry during this period – FDI remained small in scale, much of it in the form of joint ventures (Yoshino, 1970, p. 346).

Between the Second World War and the mid-1960s, therefore, when there was some liberalisation of FDI, the policy regime remained extremely restrictive. In particular, before 1963, foreign ownership was limited to 49%, while in some “vital industries” FDI was banned altogether. Consequently, FDI accounted for only 6% of total foreign capital inflow between 1949 and 1967 (Yoshino, 1970, p. 347).

There has been some relaxation in policy over time, albeit as a very slow and gradual process. After 1963, that foreign ownership of over 50% was allowed, even in some hitherto prohibited “vital industries” (Yoshino, 1970, p. 349). However, “each investment application had to go through individual screening and was rigorously examined by the Foreign Investment Council” (p. 349). Moreover, “the criteria for screening foreign investment were stated with characteristic vagueness, giving the government officials and the Foreign Investment Council considerable latitude” (p. 350).
In 1967, FDI was further liberalised. However, even this was highly restrictive (the following details are from Yoshino, 1970, pp. 361-3). The 1967 liberalisation “automatically” allowed a maximum of 50% foreign ownership in 33 industries (so-called “Category I industries”), but this was on the condition that: (1) the Japanese partner in the joint venture must be engaged in the same line of business as the contemplated joint venture, while one Japanese partner must own at least 1/3 of the joint venture; (2) the Japanese representation on the board of directors must be greater than the proportion of Japanese ownership in the venture; and (3) there should be no provision that the consent of a particular officer or a stockholder be required to execute corporate affairs – a hardly “automatic” approval! Furthermore, these conditions covered industries in which Japanese firms were already well established and that were therefore not attractive to foreign investors (e.g., household appliances, sheet glass, cameras, pharmaceuticals, etc.). This is proven by the fact that “more than a year went by before the first joint venture was established” (Yoshino, 1970, p. 363). The 17 “Category II industries” in which 100% foreign ownership was allowed were in sectors where Japanese firms were even more securely established (ordinary steel, motorcycles, beer, cement, etc.). And importantly, in both categories, “brownfield” FDI was not allowed.

Further liberalisation in 1969 added 135 and 20 industries to Categories I and II. In order to defuse foreign criticisms this round of liberalisation deliberately included a number of attractive industries, but which were mostly unattractive to foreigners. A number of strategic industries (especially distribution, petrochemicals, and automobiles) were considered as possible candidates for FDI liberalisation during this period, but in the end the proposal was rejected. This is hardly a surprising decision given that the total output of the Japanese industry - which was already the second largest in the world - was less than half that of General Motors, whose annual sales were larger than Japan’s national budget. Similarly the total outstanding share of Toyota Motors at current market values was only about one-fifth of the annual profit of General Motors (Yoshino, 1970, pp. 366-7).

This highly restrictive policy stance has been maintained in subsequent periods despite a gradual liberalisation of FDI at the formal level. As is the case in Germany and many other European countries, FDI was further constrained by the existence of informal defence mechanisms against hostile takeover, especially the cross-shareholding arrangements that lock up 60-70% of the shares in friendly hands (major lending banks, related enterprises).

Consequently, Japan was arguably the least FDI-dependent country outside the socialist bloc. Between 1971-90 (the post-95 data are not available, but there is no indication that it has drastically changed), FDI accounted for only about 0.1% of total fixed capital formation in the country (data from UNCTAD, various years). The developed country average was 3.5% for the 15-year period before the late-1990s merger boom (that is, 1981-95).
Korea

While Korea has not by any means been hostile to foreign capital *per se*, it clearly preferred, if the situation allowed it, to allow it under “national” management, rather than relying on TNCs (the following analysis heavily draws from Chang, 1998; for more details, refer to Koo, 1993). According to Amsden (1989), only 5% of total foreign capital inflow into Korea between 1963 and 1982 (excluding foreign aid, which was important until the early 1960s but not beyond) was in the form of FDI (p. 92, table 5). Even for the 1962-93 period, this ratio remained a mere 9.7%, despite the surge in FDI that followed liberalisation of FDI policy in the mid-1980s (Lee, 1994, p. 193, table 7-4).

The Korean government designed its FDI policy on the basis of a clear and rather sophisticated notion of the costs and benefits of inviting TNCs and hence approved FDI only when the potential net benefits were expected to be positive. Korea’s 1981 *White Paper on Foreign Investment* provides a fine specimen of this policy vision (see EPB, 1981). The White Paper lists various benefits of FDI such as investment augmentation, employment creation, industrial “upgrading” effect, balance of payments contribution and technology transfer, but is also clearly aware of its costs arising from transfer pricing, restrictions on imports and exports of the subsidiaries, “crowding out” of domestic investors in the domestic credit market, allocative inefficiencies due to “non-competitive” market structure, retardation of technological development, “distortion” of industrial structure due to the introduction of “inappropriate” products, and even the exercise of political influences by the TNCs on the formation of policies (EPB, 1981, pp. 50-64). It is interesting to note that this list includes more or less all the issues identified in the academic debates.

The policies towards TNCs employed by Korea have had a number of elements, but the most important was clearly the restrictions on entry and ownership. Initially, until the early 1970s, when the level of FDI was low, the government was quite willing to allow 100% foreign ownership, especially in the assembly industries in free-trade zones that were established in 1970. However, as the country tried to move into more sophisticated industries, for which the development of local technological capabilities was essential, it started to restrict foreign ownership more directly (Lee, 1994, pp. 187-8).

To begin with, there were policies that restricted the sectors that were open to TNCs. Until as late as the early 1980s, around 50% of all industries and 20% of the manufacturing industries were still “off-limits” to FDI (EPB, 1981, pp. 70-1). Even when entry was allowed, the government tried to encourage joint ventures, preferably under local majority ownership, in an attempt to facilitate the transfer of core technologies and managerial skills.
In the sectors where FDI was allowed, foreign ownership above 50% was prohibited except in areas where FDI were deemed to be of “strategic” importance, which covered only about 13% of all the manufacturing industries (EPB, 1981, p. 70). This included industries where access to proprietary technology was deemed essential for further development of the industry, and industries where the capital requirement and/or the risks involved in the investment was very large. The ownership ceiling was also relaxed if: (i) the investment was made in the free trade zones; (ii) the investments were made by overseas Koreans; or (iii) the investment would “diversify” the origins of FDI into the country – namely, if the investment came from countries other than the USA and Japan, which had previously dominated the Korean FDI scene. For details, see EPB (1981, pp. 70-1).

As a result, as of the mid-1980s, only 5% of TNC subsidiaries in Korea were wholly-owned, whereas the corresponding figures were 50% for Mexico and 60% for Brazil, countries which are often believed to have had a much higher “anti-foreign” policy orientation than that of Korea (Evans, 1987, p. 208).

Policy measures other than the ones concerning entry and ownership were also used to control the activities of TNCs in accordance with national developmental goals.

First, there were measures to ensure that the “right” kinds of technology were acquired and on the “right” terms. The technology to be brought in by investing TNCs was carefully screened to ensure that it was not obsolete and that the royalties charged to local subsidiaries, if any, would not be excessive.

Second, preference was given to investors that were willing to transfer technology, unless the technologies they offered were not considered to be useful. ¹⁶

Third, local contents requirements were quite strictly imposed, in order to maximise technological spillovers from TNC presence. It is noteworthy that the targets for localisation were realistically set so as not to impede Korea’s export competitiveness – in some industries they were more strictly applied to the products destined for the domestic market.

The overall result of these measures is that, together with Japan, Korea has remained one of the least FDI-dependent countries in the world. Between 1971-95, FDI accounted for less than 1% of total fixed capital formation in the country (data from UNCTAD, various years), while the developing country average for the 1981-95 period (pre-1980 figures are not available) was 4.3%.
Liberalisation of FDI began in the mid-1980s and was drastically accelerated following the 1997 financial crisis. This was not only due to IMF pressure but also to the decision by a number of key Korean policy-makers that the country could not survive unless it allowed its firms to become fully incorporated into the emerging international production network. It remains to be seen whether this decision was the right one.

Taiwan

Taiwan has taken a similar attitude towards FDI, utilising virtually all the measures taken by Korea used to control FDI (see Wade, 1990, pp. 148-56, and Schive, 1993, for further details). However, Taiwan’s FDI policy has had to be somewhat more tempered than that of Korea for two reasons. First, due to the relative absence of large domestic private sector firms, which could provide credible alternatives to (or joint-venture partners with) TNCs, the Taiwanese government had to be more flexible on the ownership question. Therefore, in terms of the ownership structure of TNC subsidiaries Taiwan lies somewhere in between Korea and Latin America, with 33.5% of the TNC subsidiaries (excluding the ones owned by overseas Chinese) being wholly-owned as of 1985 (Schive, 1993, p. 319). Second, during the 1970s, when the diplomatic winds blew strongly in favour of China, Taiwan made efforts to host big-name TNCs, especially from the USA, by offering them exceptional privileges (e.g., guaranteed protection against imports) in order to strengthen its diplomatic position (Wade, 1990, pp. 154-5).

Despite these constraints, “foreign investment proposals have been evaluated in terms of how much they open new markets, build new exports, transfer technology, intensify input-output links, make Taiwan more valuable to multinationals a foreign investment site and as a source for important components, and enhance Taiwan’s international political support” (Wade, 1990, p. 150). The 1962 Guidelines on Foreign Investment - the backbone of Taiwan’s FDI policies - limited FDI to “industries which would introduce new products or direct their activities toward easing domestic shortages, exporting, increasing the quality of existing products, and lowering domestic product prices.” (Wade, 1990, p. 150, f.n. 33). This meant that, as in Korea, the favoured types of FDI kept changing with the changes in the country’s economic and political conditions. After encouraging it during the 1960s, for example, FDI in labour-intensive industries was discouraged or prevented in the 1970s (Wade, 1990, p. 151).

16 For example, the Korean government chose in 1993 the Anglo-French joint venture (GEC Alsthom), organised around the producer of French TGV, as the partner in its new joint venture to build the country’s fast train network. This was mainly because it offered more in terms of
Over time, Korea has taken a number of measures to effect these policy shifts. First of all, foreign ownership was restricted, although not as strictly as in Korea. There was, in particular, a restriction on the extent to which foreign investors could capitalise on their technology. In the case of a joint venture, the technology could not be valued at more than 15% of the TNC’s equity contribution (Wade, 1990, p. 152).

Second, local content requirements were extensively used, although as in Korea, they were typically less tough for export products (Wade, 1990, pp. 151-2 for details on the operation of local content requirements). In some cases, the government gave approval for investment on condition that the TNC would help its domestic suppliers to upgrade their technology (Wade, 1990, p. 152).

Third, export requirements were also widely used (Wade, 1990. P.152). This was initially motivated by the foreign exchange consequences of FDI but it was maintained even after Taiwan had no more foreign exchange shortage, because it was seen as a way to “insure that the [foreign] company brings to Taiwan a technology advanced enough for its products to compete in other (generally wealthy Western) markets” (Wade, 1990, pp. 152).

The overall result was that, although somewhat more dependent on FDI than were Japan or Korea, Taiwan was one of the less FDI-dependent countries in the world. Between 1971-99, FDI accounted for only about 2.3% of total fixed capital formation in the country (data from UNCTAD, various years), while the developing country average for the 1981-95 period (pre-1980 figures are not available) was 4.3%.

Lessons from the East Asian Experience
As was the case with the USA in the 19th century, the three largest East Asian “miracle” economies have tried to use foreign capital under national management as much as they can, and consequently have used extensive controls on foreign investment in terms of ownership, entry, and performance requirement, throughout their developmental period. Until recently Japan and Korea in particular relied very little on FDI, while even Taiwan, the most FDI-friendly among the three countries, remained below international average in its reliance on FDI.

This approach was decidedly “strategic” in the sense that, depending on the role of the particular sectors in the overall developmental plan of the time, each of these countries applied very liberal technology transfer than did its Japanese and German competitors who offered technologically superior products (Financial Times, 23 August 1993, as cited in Chang, 1998, p. 108).

17 For example, the 1962 Guidelines subjected industries such as refrigerators, air conditioners, transformers, televisions, radios, cars, motorcycles, tractors, and diesel engines to local content requirements (Wade, 1990, pp. 150-1, f.n. 33).
policies in certain sectors (e.g., labour-intensive industries established in free trade zones in Korea and Taiwan) while being very restrictive in others. It goes without saying therefore that the same industry could, and has been, subject to relatively liberal treatment at certain periods, yet be subject at other times to stricter regulations (and vice versa), depending on the changes in the external environment, the country’s stage of development, and the development of the indigenous firms in the industries concerned. The experience of Korea and Taiwan, in particular, which provided extensive financial incentives to TNCs investing in their countries while imposing extensive performance requirements, show that FDI brings the most benefit when carrot and stick measures are combined rather than when either carrots or sticks alone are used.
3. IMPLICATIONS: LESSONS OF HISTORY

My recent book, *Kicking Away the Ladder*, shows that, when they were in “catching-up” positions and trying to establish their industries against the competition from the more efficient producers of the more advanced countries, virtually none of today’s developed countries pursued the free trade policies that they are so eager to impose on developing countries today (Chang, 2002, chapter 2).

An examination of their policies in relation to foreign investment reveals the same picture. In short, when they were net recipients of foreign investment, all of today’s developed countries imposed strict regulations, including restricting the entry of foreign investment. Very often, the entry restrictions were directly imposed, ranging from a simple ban on entry into particular sectors to the allowance of entry on certain conditions (e.g., requirements for joint ventures and ceilings on foreign ownership).

However, in some cases the scope for foreign investment was also restricted through informal mechanisms that prevented hostile acquisitions and takeovers by foreign investors (“brownfield” investment). This was achieved, in the first place, through the presence of SOEs or by the government holding significant minority shares in enterprises in the key sectors – for example, 20% of Volkswagen shares is owned by the state government of Lower Saxony. Even when privatising SOEs, some governments, notably that of France, made sure that a controlling stake was held by friendly “core” shareholders. Others, such as the USA and Finland, restricted the entry of foreign investment by regulating the forms of corporate governance - they explicitly required, at least in some key sectors, that all members of boards of directors should be citizens and that non-resident foreign shareholders could not vote, which obviously discouraged potential foreign investors, who were not given control commensurate to their ownership status.

When entry was allowed, governments placed numerous performance requirements on investors. Some of the requirements were put in place for balance of payments reasons, such as export requirements, foreign exchange balancing requirements, or ceilings on licensing fees. However, most were put in place in order to ensure that local businesses picked up advanced technologies and managerial skills from their interaction with foreign investors, either through direct transfer or through indirect spillover. Local content requirements and explicit requirements for technology transfer were the most obvious ways to ensure this. Some countries, such as Taiwan, took this logic further and explicitly required foreign investors to help their local suppliers to upgrade their technology. Bans on majority foreign ownership or the encouragement of joint venture were also ways to encourage the transfer of key technologies.
and managerial skills. A ban on the employment of foreigners, as used in the USA in earlier times, can also increase the chance that skills are directly transferred to the locals.

In cases where no formal performance requirements were exercised, most developed countries used them informally, as we mentioned above. Despite being rendered “illegal” by the TRIMS agreement, the local contents requirement is still being used by some developed countries, albeit under a different guise. The “rules of origin” adopted by the EU and the NAFTA to specify the local contents of products that qualify for the preferential treatment in these regional free-trade agreements, effectively set local contents requirements for foreign investors in strategic industries (note that “local” here has been expanded beyond old national borders). The EU has strict rules of origin in automobiles, semi-conductors, textiles and apparel, and photocopiers, and telecom switching equipments, while the NAFTA has rules covering colour TVs, computers, telecommunications equipments, office equipments, automobiles, machines tools, forklift trucks, fabricated metals, household appliances, furniture, tobacco products, and textiles (for further details, see Kumar, 2001, p. 3152, Box 1).

As in the case of trade policy, the exact strategies that were used to regulate foreign investment varied across countries, ranging from the very welcoming (but not laissez-faire and increasingly selective over time) strategy of Ireland to the very restrictive strategies employed by Finland, Japan, Korea, and the 19th-century USA in certain sectors (especially finance and navigation). In other words, there was no “one-size-fits-all” model of foreign investment regulation. However, one common factor is that they all took a strategic approach to the issue of foreign investment regulation.

This approach meant that different sectors could be subjected to different policies even at the same point in time. For example, Korea and Taiwan applied liberal policies towards FDI in labour-intensive industries while applying very restrictive policies towards FDI in the more technologically advanced industries, where they wanted to build local technological capabilities. Also, over time, with changes in their economic structure and external conditions, their policy stances changed. After it had exhausted the benefits that it could gain from the inflow of export-oriented labour-intensive FDI, Ireland shifted from a rather permissive and unfocused foreign investment policy to a focused and selective one in the mid-1980s, in order to “upgrade” the contents of FDI. Korea had a relatively open policy towards FDI in the automobile sector until the mid-1970s, but it tightened the policy afterwards in an attempt to promote domestic automobile producers. While such tightening led to the withdrawal of some foreign investors (Ford and Fiat), the policy resulted in the establishment of a spectacularly successful automobile industry.
To sum up, the historical experiences of today’s developed countries show that a strategic and flexible approach is essential if countries are to use foreign investment in a way that is beneficial for their long-term national interests. None of these countries pursued policies that were uncritically welcoming to foreign investment, in contrast to what many of them recommend to today’s developing countries. In light of these lessons, we can conclude that the current proposals made by the developed countries in the WTO in relation to foreign investment regulation go directly against the interests of the developing countries.
4. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

When criticised along the above line, the proponents of an MIA come back with a few objections that may seem plausible at first sight. However, their objections lack in logic and empirical basis.

4.1. “Times Have Changed” – The Irrelevance of History?

The most typical response to the historical criticism that we advanced above is to argue that “times have changed”. It is argued that, thanks to globalisation in the recent periods, restrictive foreign investment policies that may have been beneficial in the past – say, in Japan in the 1960s or Korea in the 1970s – are not so any more. They argue that, with the increased mobility of capital, foreign investment is becoming more and more important in determining a country’s competitive position in the world economy, and therefore that any regulation of foreign investment is likely to harm the potential host country.

One obvious weakness with this argument is that there is no clear evidence that we are now living in such a “brave new world” that all past experiences have become irrelevant. The world may have become much more globalised than, say, in the 1960s and the 1970s, but it is not clear whether globalisation has progressed so much that we have had a “structural break” with the past. The fact that China has been able to attract a huge amount of foreign investment and benefit from it despite, or rather because of, its strategic regulation of foreign investment suggests that there has been no such clean break with past patterns. Also, in another era of high globalisation, that is, during the late 19th and the early 20th century, when the world economy was as much, or even more in areas like immigration, globalised as that of today (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1996, and Hirst & Thompson, 1999, ch. 2), the USA attracted by far the largest amount of foreign investment at the time and grew the fastest in the world despite having a restrictive foreign investment policy regime.

Moreover, the current process of globalisation can be reversed, if it is not carefully managed. This is because under-regulated globalisation can lead to instability and stagnation, thereby leading to political discontent and policy reversals. This is exactly how the earlier phase of globalisation had been reversed between the First World War and the Second World War, and we have every sign that the world may be moving that way again.

We have suffered enough in the past from people who think they can transcend history and build a “brave new world” that has an entirely new set of laws and rules. The Cambodian communist leader Pol Pot, who declared “year zero”, may be the most extreme example of this,
but the now-discredited gurus of the “new economy” also suffered from the same delusion. We ignore history at our own peril.

4.2. “We Want to Protect the Developing Countries from Harming Themselves”

Some proponents of the MIA admit that in the past some countries have successfully regulated foreign investments for their benefits, although when they say this they are mainly thinking about the more recent examples like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in the post-war period, rather than the USA in the 19th century or Finland since the mid-20th century. They argue, however, they still want to install an MIA because in many more cases, especially in the developing countries, foreign investment regulation has had negative effects. If left alone, they argue, many developing countries are likely to repeat the mistakes of the past, and therefore having constraints on their policy freedom will actually protect them from making mistakes.

This is a curious argument. Those who want an MIA tend to be free-market economists who criticise various interventionist policies at the domestic level for being “paternalistic” and restricting the “freedom of choice”. But when it comes to the choices for the developing countries, they seem to see no contradiction in taking that very paternalistic attitude that they so much criticise in other contexts.

Even if strictly regulating foreign investment is likely to bring about “wrong” outcomes – which we do not accept – one should allow countries “the right to be wrong”, if one is a consistent free-market economist who wants to preserve freedom of choice and who does not believe in top-down intervention.

4.3. “The Agreement Can Be Made Flexible Enough – We Simply Want Certainty”.

Another typical response to our line of argument, which especially comes from the EU negotiators, is that the MIA need not harm the developing countries, as it can be negotiated in such a way that there is enough policy flexibility.

Proponents of an investment agreement argue that developing country “policy space” can be guaranteed by making the agreement extremely flexible. Especially emphasised is the GATS-style positive list approach that they propose, where the MIA would apply only to sectors that countries explicitly designate. This way, the proponents argue, countries can shut as many sectors as they like from foreign investment for as long as they want. For example, Fabien Lecroz, the EC negotiator, told NGOs at a Geneva seminar on 20 March 2003: ‘you could be a
WTO member, a signatory of an investment agreement, and keep your market completely closed to FDI, and with no national treatment. That is your policy choice.”

One immediate question that arises in one’s mind is: if so much flexibility is allowed, why bother with an agreement? The proponents of an MIA say they still think an MIA is important because it gives certainty to foreign investors about the host country policies. They argue that enhanced certainty will help developing countries as well, because it will increase the flow of foreign investments into them.

However, when all empirical evidence show that policy certainty is at best only a minor determinant of foreign investment flows, this is a rather curious attitude to take, given that whatever little additional investment a country attracts should come at the cost of reduced flexibility.

More importantly, the flexibility that is offered by the proponents of an MIA is a very curious sort of flexibility, as it is highly limited and one-way. It is highly limited because once you open up a sector, there is no flexibility within that sector. The only “flexibility” that is available is regulation based on balance-of-payments considerations, but this is only a temporary arrangement. It is one-way, because once you open up a sector, it is going to be extremely difficult, if not completely impossible, to re-regulate that sector.

Moreover, when non-discrimination is a “core principle” of the WTO, part of its institutional DNA, however much flexibility is initially provided, there will be an inevitable tendency for negotiators to chip away at developing countries’ national policy space in this and successive rounds of negotiations, forcing them into a developmentally premature application of national treatment to FDI. The recent leak of the EU’s requests under the GATS process amply justifies these fears (World Development Movement, 2003, also see the appendix).

4.4. “An MIA in the WTO is the Lesser of the Two Evils” – The Fears of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)

Some developing country negotiators who are aware of the restrictions that an MIA is going to place on their countries’ policy freedom still argue they want an MIA because it is the “lesser of the two evils”. They argue that, in the absence of an MIA, powerful countries, especially the increasingly-unilateralist USA, will put pressure on developing countries to adopt bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which are bound to be more restrictive than any MIA through the WTO. In addition, some countries worry that similar pressure will come through regional trade agreements (RTAs). In particular, the Latin American countries fear that they will be forced to
adopt a NAFTA-style high-octane investment agreement through the negotiation for the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), if they are not protected by an MIA.

While it is true that BITs and RTAs can be more restrictive than an MIA, this is not a foregone conclusion. There are well-informed observers who think BITs can actually provide more flexibility. Kumar (2001) argues that the existence of some 1,700 BITs as of 2000 is evidence that the greater flexibility that BITs give makes its conclusion easy (p. 3,157). Also, BITs and RTAs, involving a lower number of parties, may be slightly more re-negotiable than an MIA.

Moreover, it is not as if the developed countries are going to give up existing BITs and RTAs or stop pushing for new ones, if an MIA is agreed in the WTO. The MIA will simply be an add-on, rather than a replacement for BITs and RTAs. Indeed, the experience with the TRIPS agreement shows that, once adopted, a multilateral agreement tends to be interpreted as a “floor” in bilateral negotiations, thereby raising the standards expected in bilateral agreements (Kumar, 2003, p. 223). The likely result is that the MIA will form the floor and developing countries will be put under pressure to concede even more policy freedom in BITs.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our historical examination shows that the developed countries did not use the liberal foreign investment policy that they ask of the developing countries, when they were developing countries themselves. When they were net capital-importers, they used a wide range of policy measures and informal restrictions in order to align the interests of foreign investors with their national interests. The USA, now a champion for the rights of foreign investors, used to regulate foreign investment quite heavily until the early 20th century. When, after the Second World War, the UK, France, and Germany became net capital-importers they introduced a lot of formal and informal regulations on foreign investment. Japan used to regulate foreign investment heavily, but is now a strong advocate of MIA.

Unfortunately, many of the policy measures on foreign investment adopted in the past by today’s developed countries have become “illegal” due to existing agreements in the WTO such as the TRIMS agreement or the GATS. And already the review of TRIMS and the negotiation for GATS-2 are threatening to make illegal many of those measures that are still available. If an MIA is added on top of it, virtually none of the measures used by the developed countries in the past will be available for developing countries today. And even if they can come up with some novel policy measures, they are likely to be thwarted by the all-powerful principle of “national treatment” that is at the heart of the MIA proposal.

The result cannot be more serious – when combined with other agreements in the WTO, it will mean a virtual end to economic sovereignty of the developing countries.
REFERENCES


THE UNU/INTECH DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

# 2003-12 Regulation of Foreign Investment in Historical Perspective by Ha-Joon Chang, December 2003
# 2003-10 The Role Of Market, Trust and Government in the Development of the Information Hardware Industry in Taiwan By Rajah Rasiah and Yeo Lin, October 2003
# 2003-9 Growth Theories Revisited: Enduring Questions with Changing Answers By C. V. Vaitsos, October 2003
# 2003-8 Designing National Regimes that Promote Public Health Objectives By Padmashree Gehl Sampath, September 2003
# 2003-7 FDI-Facilitated Development: The Case of the Natural Gas Industry of Trinidad and Tobago. By Lou Anne A. Barclay, September 2003
# 2003-6 Sources of Training in African Clusters and Awareness of ICTs: A Study of Kenya and Ghana By Catherine Nyaki Adeya, September 2003
# 2003-5 The Internet Diffusion in Sub-Saharan Africa: A cross-country Analysis By Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Kaushalesh Lal, July 2003
# 2003-2 Systems of Innovation and Human Capital in African Development By Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lou Anne Barclay, May 2003
# 2003-1 Deregulation, Entry of MNCs, Public Technology Procurement and Innovation Capability in India's Telecommunications Equipment Industry By Sunil Mani, February 2003
# 2002-10 Moving Up Or Going Back The Value Chain an Examination of The Role of Government With Respect to Promoting Technological Development in The Philippines By Sunil Mani, November 2002
# 2002-9 Research Capacity Building in Nicaragua: From Partnership with Sweden to Ownership and Social Accountability By Léa Velho, October 2002
# 2002-8 R&D in the Public and Private Sector in Brazil: Complements or Substitutes? By Lea Velho and Tirso W. Saenz, July 2002
# 2002-7 Systemic Coordination and Human Capital Development: Knowledge Flows in Malaysia’s MNC-Driven Electronics Clusters By Rajah Rasiah, June 2002
# 2002-6 What is the ‘Knowledge Economy’? Knowledge Intensity and Distributed Knowledge Bases By Keith Smith, June 2002
# 2002-4 Institutional Support for Investment in New Technologies: The Role of Venture Capital Institutions in Developing Countries By Sunil Mani and Anthony Bartzokas, May 2002
# 2002-3 Manufacturing Response in a National System of Innovation: Evidence from the Brewing Firms in Nigeria By Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, April 2002
# 2002-1 TRIPs and Capability Building in Developing Economies By Rajah Rasiah, March 2002